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“If your richest relative buys a new house and you have to help 
take the wheels off of it” . . . you might be a redneck.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Jeff Foxworthy’s popular humor pokes fun at a demographic 
that is all too often misrepresented in our culture.2  Foxworthy does 
not likely wish any harm upon the people that have made him a 
household name; in truth, however, the redneck “trailer trash” 
stigma has legitimately haunted residents of manufactured home 
parks (MHPs) for decades.3  Most of the country perceives residents 
of MHPs to be seriously deficient: deficient in income, education, 
intelligence and moral fiber.4  Popular media further the 
stereotype by negatively depicting MHPs as hotbeds of sex and 
violence that drastically reduce adjacent property values.5
MHPs are a unique living arrangement because, unlike a 
typical residential lease, residents in these properties typically own 
the home in which they live but lease the land on which it sits.
 
6  
Legally, MHPs are the private property of their owners,7 and while 
the residents pay the property taxes on their homes, the owner of 
the park pays the real estate tax on the land.8




                                                          
 1. JEFF FOXWORTHY, YOU MIGHT BE A REDNECK IF . . . 1 (1989). 
 2. JOHN FRASER HART ET AL., THE UNKNOWN WORLD OF THE MOBILE HOME 2 
(Gregory Conniff et al. eds., 2002). 
 3. Marshall Tanick, Commentary: Recent Rulings Prove Mobile Home Residents 
Successfully, DAILY RECORD AND THE KANSAS CITY DAILY NEWS-PRESS, June 3, 2006, 
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4181/is_20060603/ai_n 
16456646/pg_1. 
 and park owners wield a great deal of power over their 
 4. HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. 
 5. See id. 
 6. E.g., HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 78; Minnesota Manufactured Housing 
Association, http://www.mnmfg home.org/ourhomes.php (last visited Dec. 15, 
2008). 
 7. E.g., HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 79. 
 8. E.g., id. at 78. 
 9. See The Housing Preservation Project, http://www.hppinc.org/?q=mhp 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
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residents as a result.10  There is very little turnover in MHPs because 
the cost to move one’s home is extremely prohibitive.11  Hardly 
“mobile” at all, MHP residents often complain they are effectively 
held captive with little legal recourse against greedy and 
unscrupulous park owners.12  Unable to uproot, residents are 
victimized by arbitrary rent increases, inadequate park 
maintenance, hidden fees, “tie-ins,” and unreasonable rules and 
regulations.13
MHP owners make rules dealing with everything from the kind 
of pets they will allow in the park
 
14 to the types of doors they will 
allow on residents’ porches.15  Both the way a resident winterizes his 
home and his desire to erect a swing set for his children may need 
prior approval by the MHP owner.16
                                                          
 10. See id.; see also HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 80. 
  In one Minnesota MHP, 
residents may own multiple animals in only one of three ways: two 
 11. See HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 80 (noting that in 1990, the cost of 
relocation ran around $2,500 to $3,000 for a single-wide, and $10,000 to $12,000 
for a double-wide). 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. 
A tie-in is an arrangement that requires all tenants to buy their homes 
from the park owner, who also owns a dealership.  Many mobile homes 
are bought secondhand, but tie-ins prevent tenants from buying cheaper 
used units unless the owner happens to have one for sale.  Park owners 
may also require tenants to buy goods and services, such as cable 
television, propane gas, insurance, and home improvements only from 
vendors who will give the owner a kickback.  Tie-ins also force departing 
tenants to sell their homes through the park owner, and most tenants do 
sell their homes when they leave a park.  Because of state licensing fees 
and highway restrictions on oversized loads, it is usually cheaper to buy a 
new home at the new location than to pay thousands of dollars to move 
the old unit and run the risk of serious damage in transit. 
Id. 
 14. See List of Rules from APAC, Rules & Regulations, Section IV Pets 
(received Nov. 18, 2008) (on file with the William Mitchell Law Review).  
Additionally, this rule required a resident to submit photos of all owned pets, and 
the only pets allowed without prior park approval were fish, caged birds, gerbils, 
and hamsters.  See id.  Snakes, rabbits and ferrets, as well as certain dog breeds 
including Dobermans, Rottweilers, German Shepherds, Pitt Bulls, Chows, wolves, 
or any mixed thereof were strictly prohibited.  Id. 
 15. List of Rules from APAC, Park Rules, Section III (received Nov. 18, 2008) 
(on file with the William Mitchell Law Review).  “Porches and entry ways must 
have a commercially manufactured storm door and interior door with a window in 
it.  All entry way plans must be approved in writing before construction, or they 
may be subject to removal at any time.  No entry way will be allowed that detracts 
from the overall appearance of the home or park.”  Id. 
 16. See id. (received Nov. 18, 2008) (on file with the William Mitchell Law 
Review). 
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cats, one cat and one dog, or two dogs, provided that each dog 
weighs less than fifteen pounds.17  Pets and porches aside, MHP 
owners can legally make rules regarding a much more significant 
topic: free expression.18  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
interpreted a statute dealing with park rules limiting freedom of 
expression in MHP communities19 in All Parks Alliance for Change v. 
Uniprop Manufactured Housing Communities Income Fund.20
On one hand, an MHP is private property; one of the essential 
sticks in the bundle of property rights is an owner’s right to exclude 
others.
 
21  On the other hand, freedom of expression is one of the 
most important and celebrated constitutional guarantees 
Americans enjoy every day.22  This note examines a matter of first 
impression: the Minnesota Supreme Court’s stance on the 
application of the First Amendment within MHPs.  It first discusses 
the interplay between private property rights and the First 
Amendment, followed by some historical background of MHPs and 
their legal treatment in Minnesota.23  It then chronicles the 
supreme court’s analysis and holding in All Parks,24 and analyzes the 
court’s refusal to apply First Amendment principles to park rules 
that limit freedom of expression.25  This note concludes that the All 
Parks analysis is contrary to the intent of the Minnesota legislature 
and not in keeping with the progressive record or ideals of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.26
                                                          
 17. List of Rules from APAC, Park Rules, Section IV Pets (received Nov. 18, 
2008) (on file with the William Mitchell Law Review).  Moreover, for each pet, a 
resident may be subject to a monthly “pet fee” added to their rental payments 
simply for owning the pet.  Id. 
 18. See MINN. STAT. § 327C.13 (2006). 
 19.  
No park owner shall prohibit or adopt any rule prohibiting residents or 
other persons from peacefully organizing, assembling, canvassing, 
leafletting or otherwise exercising within the park their right of free 
expression for noncommercial purposes.  A park owner may adopt and 
enforce rules that set reasonable limits as to time, place and manner. 
Id. 
 20. 732 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 2007). 
 21. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979). 
 
 22. See, e.g., infra notes 28, 30–36, 167, and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
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II. HISTORY 
A.  Background: Free Expression and Private Property 
The basic property right to exclude27 and the constitutional 
right to speak freely28 are among the most deeply embedded 
building blocks in the foundation of American jurisprudence.29  
Not surprisingly, one person’s desire to express himself often 
clashes with another’s property interest to prevent that very 
expression.30  Though the exercise of free speech and the interests 
of private property are sometimes directly at odds, generally “the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against 
abridgment by government.”31  The First Amendment “does not 
provide redress against abridgment by private individuals or 
corporations.”32
B. The Functional Equivalent Exception: Marsh 
 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, however, there is an 
exception to this general rule.33
                                                          
 27. See generally Alexander Tsesis, Undermining Inalienable Rights: From Dred Scott 
to the Rehnquist Court, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1184 (2007) (describing the right to 
own property as being intrinsic to the nature of humanity). 
 28. See generally Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free 
Expression: From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 773 passim (2008). 
 29. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, V, XIV, § 1 (providing rights of freedom of 
speech and due process). 
 30. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens 
v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S 507 (1976); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 
(1946). 
 31. State v. Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513) (emphasis added).  See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 469 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 2005) 
(2000).  Compare Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 
94, 114 (1973) (emphasizing that “government action” is necessary for First 
Amendment protection), with Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508 (applying First Amendment 
protection to unlicensed visitors distributing literature in a private “company-
owned town” because it was functionally equivalent to a town or municipality). 
 32. Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d at 341 (citing Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & 
Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 94 (Minn. 1979).  Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 
551, 568 (1972) (asserting that the Supreme Court has “never held that a 
trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on 
property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes 
only.”). 
 33. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506–08. 
  When an individual or 
corporation owns property in a way that makes it sufficiently similar 
5
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to a governmental or public entity, that property is functionally 
treated as a public forum.34  Private property that is functionally 
equivalent to public property will essentially be treated as public.35  
A privately held company town that had “all the characteristics of 
any other American town,” including residential buildings, streets, 
and sewerage, was found to be a functional equivalent in Marsh v. 
Alabama.36  In Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness was arrested for trespass 
as she was distributing religious literature on a company-owned 
sidewalk in a company town.37
[If] the title to [the company town] belonged not to a 
private but to a municipal corporation and had [Marsh] 
been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance rather 
than a ruling by those appointed by the corporation to 
manage a company town it would have been clear that 
[Marsh’s] conviction [for criminal trespass] must be 
reversed.
  The Court in Marsh pointed out that 
38
In short, the Supreme Court reasoned that there was no 
discernable difference between the company town and an actual 




C. State Constitutional Interpretations 
 
1. Generally 
In addition to the national standards set forth in the 
Constitution and the Supreme Court, the exercise of free 
expression on private property varies among the states.40
                                                          
 34. Id. 
 35. See id.  Justice Black explains that “[o]wnership does not always mean 
absolute dominion.  The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property 
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by 
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”  Id. at 506. 
 36. Id. at 502. 
 37. See id. at 503–05. 
 38. Id. at 504.  See also Hudgens v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S 507, 513 
(1976) for a more brief synopsis of the decision in Marsh. 
 39. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.  Additionally, the majority in Marsh noted that 
“the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation 
of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not 
sufficient to justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern a community of 
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties.”  Id. at 509. 
  Aside 
 40. See State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 800–01 (Minn. 1999); see also 
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that a 
provision in the California Constitution that provided the public with a right to 
6
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from the varying interpretations of what constitutes public versus 
private land, states differ on how their respective constitutions are 
to be interpreted.41  Most state constitutions do not apply broader 
speech protection than that offered by the First Amendment.42  
Some state supreme courts, however, interpret their constitutions 
more broadly in specific circumstances.43  Simply put, a state may 
“adopt . . . individual liberties more expansive than those conferred 
by the Federal Constitution.”44  Massachusetts,45 California,46 
Oregon,47 and New Jersey,48 for example, all have interpreted their 




Historically, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been 
particularly wary of expanding personal liberties beyond the 
bounds of the U.S. Constitution.50
                                                                                                                                  
engage in free expression at a private shopping mall did not contravene a Federal 
Constitutional provision). 
 41. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 800–01. 
 42. Id. at 800. 
 43. See, e.g., id. at 800–01. 
 44. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).  Accord 
Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 800–01; State v. Oman, 261 Minn. 10, 21, 110 N.W.2d 514, 
522–23 (1961). 
 45. See Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 595 (Mass. 
1983) (extending Massachusetts state constitutional protections to signature 
solicitation in large shopping malls). 
 46. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), 
aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (basing California’s speech protection inside privately 
owned shopping malls on the right to free speech and right to petition 
constitutional provisions). 
 47. See Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 849 P.2d 446, 454 (Or. 1993) (limiting 
constitutional protection in common areas of large shopping centers to persons 
seeking signatures on initiative petitions).  This decision was later abrogated by 
Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 P.3d 228, 243 (Or. 2000) (holding that the 
Oregon Constitution does not confer the right to solicit signatures in a mall). 
 48. See N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 
A.2d 757, 781 (N.J. 1994) (broadening protection under New Jersey constitution 
to “leafleting and associated speech in support of, or in opposition to causes, 
candidates, and parties.”). 
 49. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 800–01. 
  The court noted that it is a 
 50. State v. Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).  See 
generally State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726–27 (Minn. 1985) (reversing the 
supreme court’s holding that the Minnesota Constitution’s double jeopardy clause 
did not permit retrial when the Federal Constitution would not); AFSCME 
Councils 6, 14, 65 & 96 v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 570 n.12 (Minn. 1983) 
(restating that the prohibition against arbitrary lending is coextensive with that of 
7
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“significant undertaking for any state court to hold that a state 
constitution offers broader protection than similar federal 
provisions.”51  In essence, the Minnesota Supreme Court requires a 
compelling rationale for broader interpretation of the Minnesota 
Constitution than for its federal counterpart.52
In some instances, parties have overcome the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s rather high hurdle required for a broader 
interpretation.  In Women of Minnesota v. Gomez,
 
53 the court 
extended the right of privacy to cover the right to abortion funding 
for women on public assistance,54 which was a protection not 
afforded under federal law.55  The opinion supported this 
interpretation by citing Minnesota’s “long tradition of affording 
persons on the periphery of society a greater measure of 
government protection and support than may be available 
elsewhere.”56  In another decision, Friedman v. Commissioner of Public 
Safety, the Minnesota Supreme Court “extended the right to 
counsel under the Minnesota Constitution beyond that required 
under federal law based on [Minnesota’s] long tradition of 
expansive protection of fair trial rights.”57  Though examples of 
broader interpretation in Minnesota are relatively few in number, 
the court appears proud when it presents such an example.  The 
court’s opinions herald Minnesota’s “long traditions” of fairness 
and social progressiveness.58  When the court finds what it deems to 
be a sound reason for a broadened interpretation, it does not 
hesitate to extol the virtue and morality behind the Minnesota 
justice system.59
                                                                                                                                  
the federal equal protection clause); State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 
735, 738 n.6 (Minn. 1981) (noting that the protection of commercial speech 
provided by the Minnesota Constitution is no more than that provided by the 
United States Constitution).  But cf. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 
1993) (highlighting that “Minnesota is not limited by the United States Supreme 
Court and can provide more protection under the state constitution than is 
afforded under the federal constitution.”) (emphasis added). 
 51. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 799 (quoting Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 
N.W.2d 17, 30 (Minn. 1995)) (quoting Hans A. Linde, First Things First: 
Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 392 (1980)). 
 52. See Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 799–801. 
 53. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17. 
 54. Id. at 30. 
 55. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 310 (1980). 
 56. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 30. 
 57. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d at 800 (citing Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 
473 N.W.2d 828, 831–32 (Minn. 1991)). 
 58. See, e.g., Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 30; Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 831–32. 
 59. See, e.g., Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 30; Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 831–32. 
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Speaking in terms of the First Amendment specifically, the 
hurdle to compel broader protection was not overcome in State v. 
Wicklund.60  In that case, protesters sought to expand Minnesota’s 
constitution to cover their protest of fur products sold at Macy’s in 
the Mall of America.61  The court looked for a sound reason to 
broaden the state constitutional interpretation based on the purpose 
of the speech and did not find a compelling reason to extend 
protection for that purpose.62  The court dismissed the argument 
for constitutional expansion by distinguishing the purpose of the 
intended speech from a purpose that would indeed be worthy of 
greater protection.63  The court observed that the appellants’ 
“speech was directed at persuading shoppers to forgo buying fur 
products and to boycott Macy’s in an attempt to effect change in 
the retail and fur industries.  Its purpose was not to achieve some 
political goal . . . it is best characterized as protest speech, intended 
to be provocative.”64
Although the court does not make a specific ruling on what 
types of speech would necessarily compel broader protection, it 
does give some guidance.
 
65  It is clear from the holding that purely 
provocative speech will not meet the mark, but speech that 
purports to achieve some positive or constructive goal would 
embody a sound rationale for a broader interpretation.66
D. The Rise of the Manufactured Home Park 
 
1. Generally 
Though it appears that no national standard for free speech 
specifically within MHPs has been created, the importance of 
forming such a standard becomes greater every day.  Living in 
MHPs has “evolved into a common, necessary, and increasingly 
acceptable way of life in the six decades since the first crude 
camper trailer was birthed.”67
                                                          
 60. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793. 
 61. See id. at 794–95. 
 62. See id. at 801. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
  Nearly nineteen million people in 
the United States, or 7.5% of the population, reside in nine million 
 67. HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 127. 
9
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manufactured homes.68  Manufactured homes make up a 
substantial portion of Minnesota’s housing market.69  Nationally, 
manufactured homes comprised about one in three new homes.70
MHPs are ubiquitous, as “[v]irtually every city and town has 
utilitarian, low-income mobile-home parks at the edge of its built-
up area.”
 
71  Furthermore, MHPs serve a vital temporary function.72  
They provide quick and inexpensive housing for workers at 
construction sites, military bases, and new industrial plants.73  MHPs 
also often become permanent housing for those displaced after 
natural disasters, such as floods and hurricanes.74  Recently, up to 
nine thousand families made various parks throughout the Gulf 
area their temporary home immediately following Hurricane 
Katrina.75  If the trend of increasing natural disaster frequency 
persists,76
2. Minnesota 
 the growing importance of MHPs could skyrocket. 
In Minnesota, it is estimated that there are approximately 
180,000 residents living in over 900 MHPs.77  In the Twin Cities 
metro area for approximately the last twenty years, there has 
remained about 90 MHPs with an average of about 175 lots each.78  
Despite strong demand for more, this number has remained 
relatively stagnant due primarily to the difficulty of locating sites 
where cities will allow MHPs.79
                                                          
 68. JOHN KRIGGER, YOUR MOBILE HOME 16 (5th ed. 2006). 
 69. See Minnesota Manufactured Housing Association, http://www.mnmfg 
home.org/home.php (last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
  Indeed, Minnesotans are no 
exception to the negative stereotypes associated with MHP 
 70. KRIGGER, supra note 68, at 16. 
 71. HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 129. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Shaila Dewan, Holdouts Test Aid’s Limitations as FEMA Shuts a Trailer Park, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at A1.  Hurricane Andrew struck Florida in 1992, and 
FEMA housed 3,500 displaced families in twelve parks, the last of which was not 
shut down until two and a half years later.  HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 15. 
 76. See Trends in Natural Disasters, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/ 
trends-in-natural-disasters (last visited Nov. 19, 2008) (showing a sharp increase in 
natural disasters). 
 77. All Parks Alliance for Change, Fact Sheet – Manufactured Home Parks in 
Minnesota, http://www.allparksallianceforchange.org/?q=reports/mnparks (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
 78. HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 84. 
 79. See id. 
10
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residents.80  The Minneapolis Star Tribune furthered the stereotype 
in 1996, reporting that “31 percent of Blaine’s 1,161 police calls for 
domestic violence came from mobile home parks, although only 18 
percent of the city’s housing units were mobile homes.”81  A Blaine 
police supervisor deduced that there is “‘a different income level 
here, and some of the mentality is different.  People of moderate 
income are more likely to call the police, while people with money 
try to hush it up.  And,’ he added pensively, ‘the police are more 
likely to intervene in the lives of poor people.’”82
E. Legislature’s Intent to Right the Wrongs 
 
1. Initial Measures: 1973–79 
The Minnesota legislature recognized the unique nature of 
MHPs in 1973 by creating a law to control MHP landlord-tenant 
interaction: chapter 327 of the Minnesota Statutes.83  Included in 
the special law were provisions governing rental agreements, fees, 
security deposits, termination of leases for cause, and acceptable 
utility rates.84  Within a few years, however, it was clear that these 
provisions did not provide enough protection to MHP residents.85  
In 1979, the legislature heard “lengthy testimony which 
documented major abuses of power occurring through [MHP’s] 
form of private government.”86  In response, the legislature 
substantially amended the law.87
                                                          
 80. See id. (noting that most MHPs are located in lower income, blue-collar 
areas). 
 81. Id. (citing Mike Kaszuba, A Suburb’s Poorest Residents Move On, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Nov. 25, 1996, at A1, A8). 
  The 1979 amendments to chapter 
327: 
1. [R]equired that all park rules be reasonable.  [In a 
lawsuit based on this part of the law, the Attorney General 
. . . successfully sued a park owner who required the home 
owners in his park to register with him their overnight 
guests.] 
 82. HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 84–85 (quoting Kaszuba, supra note 81). 
 83. Act of May 18, 1973, ch. 295, §§ 1–7, 1973 Minn. Laws 567–69 (codified at 
MINN. STAT. §§ 327.41–.47 (1974)). 
 84. See MINN. STAT. §§ 327.41–.47 (1974). 
 85. See Office of Sen. Gene Merriam, Memorandum re. S.F. No.1918, 1982 
Minn. Leg., at 2 [hereinafter Merriam Memo] (on file with the William Mitchell Law 
Review). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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2. Prohibited substantial modification of pre-existing 
leases.  [This provision protect[ed] against major and 
unilateral changes in “the rules of the game.”  The 
Attorney General . . . used this provision to prevent a park 
from discontinuing fuel oil service to its residents in the 
middle of the winter.] 
3. The right of a resident to sell his or her home within 
the park was clarified and strengthened.  [If a home must 
be removed from a park upon sale, the value of the home 
(and the seller’s investment) drops by 30 percent or more.  
The 1979 amendments gave the resident the right to an 
in-park sale, while allowing the park to approve the 
buyer.] 
4. No-cause eviction was severely limited.  [Since the value 
of these private homes depends on access to rented land, 
the legislature chose to limit park owners to a list of 
specified causes as a basis for eviction.]88
2. Evolution of the Current MHP Law 
 
Before long, it was apparent that even with the recent 
amendments to the MHP landlord-tenant law, chapter 327 still did 
not provide adequate protection for MHP residents.89  By 1982, 
support was growing for the legislature to make additional 
protections.90  Senator Gene Merriam, a sponsor of a 1982 bill to 
amend chapter 327, noted that the 1979 amendments “made major 
improvements in the law, [but] the changes nonetheless left major 
problems.”91  Specifically, Senator Merriam mentioned that no-
cause eviction was still occurring after the 1979 amendments; 
“[r]esidents with year-long leases [could] be evicted at the end of 
the lease, even if they . . . paid their rent on time and . . . obeyed all 
park rules.”92  Senator Merriam also revealed the lack of definition 
for many key terms.93
                                                          
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 2–3 (noting that no-cause eviction still occurred and key terms 
were left undefined). 
 90. See id. at 3 (observing that hundreds of citizens attended hearings relating 
to chapter 327). 
 91. Id. at 2. 
 92. Id. at 3. 
 93. Id. 
  The law, as amended in 1979, required MHP 
rules to be “reasonable” but did not define exactly what that meant 
nor did it explain what constituted a “substantial modification” of a 
12
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preexisting lease.94
Thus, chapter 327 was amended yet again in 1982.
 
95  
According to Senator Merriam, the amendment grew out of an 
interim study suggested jointly by the Attorney General’s Office 
and the Minnesota Manufactured Housing Association, conducted 
by the House Subcommittee on Housing.96  The study “included 
five hearings around the state, in Blaine, Rosemount, St. Peter, 
Thief River Falls, and Duluth.  Five hundred citizens attended in 
Blaine; 300 in Rosemount.  The particular provisions of the [1982] 
legislation reflect the concerns voiced by citizens in more than 15 
hours of public testimony.”97  Chapter 327C, entitled 
“Manufactured Home Park Lot Rentals,” now governed the legal 
connection between MHP owners and their lessees.98
The 1982 amendment of chapter 327 added many substantial 
protections to the previous law.
 
99  Vague and general language was 
clarified and specified, no-cause eviction was eliminated, for-cause 
eviction was made more efficient, intra-park rents were made 
uniform, and sale rights were clarified.100  For MHP residents, the 
1982 amendments had to have been a Godsend; finally there was a 
degree of predictability in MHP law.101
Senator Merriam pointed to the unique nature of the 
relationship between an MHP owner and a resident as the reason 
for the necessity of these protections.
 
102  An MHP owner “has an 
unusual status.  Not simply a private land owner or an ordinary 
land-lord, the park owner has come to resemble a private 
government. . . .  [A] park owner is like an unelected mayor of a 
bedroom community.”103
[N]o park owner shall prohibit or adopt any rule 
  For this reason perhaps, the legislature 
also included an eerily constitutional section in chapter 327C in 
1982. 
That section, 327C.13, is entitled “Freedom of Expression” and 
it reads: 
                                                          
 94. Id. 
 95. See Act of March 22, 1982, ch. 526, 1982 Minn. Laws 938, 938–72 (codified 
at MINN. STAT. §§ 327C.01–.15 (2008)). 
 96. Merriam Memo, supra note 85, at 3. 
 97. Id. 
 98. MINN. STAT. §§ 327C.01–.15 (Supp. 2007). 
 99. See Merriam Memo, supra note 85, at 4. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 3–4. 
 102. See id. at 1. 
 103. Id. 
13
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prohibiting residents or other persons from peacefully 
organizing, assembling, canvassing, leafletting or 
otherwise exercising within the park their right of free 
expression for noncommercial purposes.  A park owner 
may adopt and enforce rules that set reasonable limits as 
to time, place and manner.104
For twenty-five years, neither the Minnesota Legislature nor the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had a need to reexamine this statute.  
Then in All Parks, the Minnesota Supreme Court saw fit to answer 
the question of whether First Amendment principles did indeed 
apply in the determination of a park rule’s compliance with this 
“Freedom of Expression” section.
 
105
III. THE ALL PARKS CASE 
 
A.  Background: Rule Writing and Rewriting 
Founded in 1980, All Parks Alliance for Change (APAC) is a 
Minnesota-based nonprofit organization that serves the legal 
interests of residents of MHPs.106  APAC describes itself as “the 
statewide tenents [sic] union for manufactured (mobile) home 
park residents.”107  APAC’s mission is “to serve as a vehicle to 
promote meaningful social change, to protect the legal rights of 
park residents, and to improve the quality of life in manufactured 
home parks.”108  According to its website, “APAC works to promote 
the health, safety and welfare of manufactured homeowners 
through community organizing, legal advocacy, housing 
preservation and legislative advocacy.”109  As a union, APAC 
requires annual dues.110  Membership costs $10 per household per 
year, or can be paid other ways, such as volunteer office work, 
fundraising, distributing flyers, or door knocking.111
On April 15, 2003, two APAC volunteers visited Ardmor 
 
                                                          
 104. MINN. STAT. § 327C.13 (2008). 
 105. See All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. 
Income Fund, 732 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 2007). 
 106. See id. at 191.  See generally APAC - Mission and History, 
http://www.allparksallianceforchange.org/?q=mission (last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
 107. Flyer and Survey from APAC to Residents of Lakeville MHPs (Summer 
2008) (on file with the William Mitchell Law Review). 
 108. APAC - Mission and History, supra note 106. 
 109. Id. 
 110. APAC - Become a Member, http://www.allparksallianceforchange.org/ 
?q=member (last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
 111. See id. 
14
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Village, an MHP in Lakeville.112  The volunteers left flyers on 
residents’ doorsteps explaining APAC’s purpose along with 
information regarding upcoming APAC meetings for those 
concerned about their rights as residents under Minnesota law.113  
Ardmor Village’s manager confronted the volunteers, told them 
that soliciting was not permitted, and called the police when they 
refused to leave.114
In June 2003, APAC volunteers again visited Ardmor Village 
for the same purpose, and once again were ordered to leave.
 
115  
The park manager this time, however, provided them with a map of 
the park to facilitate the distribution of APAC leaflets by direct 
mail.116  To APAC’s dismay, only about 280 of the 339 home sites 
were occupied, and the map did not contain the names of the 
Ardmor residents.117  APAC mailed the leaflets, but at least seventy 
were returned as undeliverable.118
B. District Court and Court of Appeals 
 
In February 2004, APAC filed suit against Uniprop 
Manufactured Housing Communities Income Fund (Uniprop), 
Ardmor Village’s operating company.119
                                                          
 112. All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. 
Income Fund, 732 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Minn. 2007). 
 113. Id. 
  APAC alleged that by not 
allowing the exercise of the right of free expression within the 
park, Uniprop’s management violated Minnesota Statutes section 
 114. Id.  On a side note, the tensions between APAC and the MHPs of 
Lakeville continue.  During the summer of 2008, APAC distributed a flyer to 
residents of Connelly MHP entitled: “[T]he City of Lakeville wants Connelly to 
close; they want the park to be redeveloped as a commercial property.”  Flyer and 
Survey, supra note 107.  Connelly’s owner described the flyer as “just another 
shameless membership drive for [APAC].”  Memorandum from Mike Lambert, 
President, Lakeville Commons, LLC, to Residents of Connelly Community (Aug. 
6, 2008) (on file with the William Mitchell Law Review).  The City of Lakeville 
distanced itself from the allegations of APAC, calling the information 
“misleading.”  Letter from Daryl Morey, Planning Director, City of Lakeville, to 
Resident[s] of Connelly Community (Aug. 8, 2008) (on file with the William 
Mitchell Law Review).  This recent example illustrates the inherent tension 
between a nonprofit union and a park owner: they both seek to protect MHP 
residents from the other. 
 115. All Parks, 732 N.W.2d at 191. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 192. 
15
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327C.13 (2006).120  APAC sought an injunction, actual damages for 
the costs of the leaflets,121 other costs, investigation fees, and 
reasonable attorney fees under Minnesota Statutes sections 327C.15 
and 8.31, subdivisions 1 and 3(a) (2006).122  APAC also moved for 
an injunction to bar Uniprop “from preventing it from leafleting, 
canvassing, and organizing residents of the park.”123  The district 
court issued a temporary restraining order on April 2, 2004, which 
effectively allowed APAC volunteers access to Ardmor residents 
between the hours of 9 a.m. and 8 p.m., Monday through 
Saturday.124  The trial was scheduled for November 2004, but 
months before, in August, Uniprop distributed a notice of rule 
change to Ardmor residents.125  Under the new rule, leafleting and 
canvassing for noncommercial purposes would be permitted only 
on weekdays between 11 a.m. and 6 p.m.126  Additionally, a “no-
contact” list was formed consisting of residents who opted not to be 
solicited or contacted at their homes regardless of purpose.127  This 
rule further required anyone seeking to solicit or distribute leaflets 
within the park to examine and abide by the list located in the 
community office.128
After the trial, the district court deemed Uniprop’s new rule 
unreasonable.
 
129  The court blue-penciled the rule’s time 
limitations, and Uniprop was thus enjoined from interfering with 
APAC’s noncommercial activities between 11 a.m. and 6 p.m., 
Monday through Saturday from September through April, and 
between 11 a.m. and 7 p.m. in the summer months.130
                                                          
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  APAC totaled its actual damages for the leaflet mailing at $590.16.  Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  The list comprised “those residents that have chosen not to allow any 
leafleting, canvassing or door to door solicitation of any kind, regardless of 
purpose, at their home site.”  Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  According to the district court, the rule limiting noncommercial 
speech “unreasonably curtailed APAC’s outreach efforts and presented an 
unreasonable impediment to forming a resident association.”  Id.  Furthermore, it 
was unreasonable “in that it would restrict APAC from being able to directly 
contact residents during the times in which residents are most likely to be home, 
i.e. on Saturdays during the day.”  Id. 
 130. Id. 
  The court 
upheld the use of the resident no-contact list but disagreed with the 
16
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method of its implementation; Uniprop was now to actively provide 
the list to APAC on the first day of every other month.131  Finding 
the rule unreasonable, the district court awarded APAC its 
monetary damages, attorney fees, costs, and disbursements.132
APAC was not satisfied with the district court’s decision, and 
on appeal it argued that section 327C.13 incorporates First 
Amendment principles and that the blue-penciling done by the 
district court was too restrictive of its ability to solicit park 
residents.
 
133  The court of appeals unanimously upheld the district 
court ruling, stating that the limitations imposed by the newly 
amended park rule were reasonable as required by section 
327C.13.134
The court of appeals refused to apply the First Amendment, 
concluding that “the First Amendment applies only to state action 
and protected speech.  Where a court is only enforcing the right of 
a private party, that is not clearly state action.”
 
135  The court 
rejected the argument that an MHP exists as a functional 
equivalent to a municipality: “[h]ere, appellant is a private 
landowner, not a governmental actor.  And we reject the argument 
that [Minnesota Statutes section] 327C.13 converts manufactured 
home parks into governmental entities.”136  The court also rejected 
APAC’s argument that the legislature intended for a broader 
constitutional interpretation, remarking “[n]othing in the 
language of the statute or its history indicates that the legislature 
intended to integrate First Amendment principles into this statute 
covering manufactured home communities.”137
                                                          
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  Such an award is authorized by statute: 
[I]n addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person 
injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may 
bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and 
disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney's 
fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.  The 
court may, as appropriate, enter a consent judgment or decree without 
the finding of illegality.  In any action brought by the attorney general 
pursuant to this section, the court may award any of the remedies 
allowable under this subdivision. 
MINN. STAT. § 8.31 subdiv. 3a (2006). 
 133. All Parks, 732 N.W.2d at 192. 
 134. All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. 
Income Fund, No. A05-912, 2006 WL 618932, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 
2006), aff’d, 732 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 2007). 
 135. Id. at *4. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
  The court 
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Swendsen: Property: Double-Wide Refusal of First Amendment Principles: The
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
616 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
reiterates its opinion that the First Amendment is not even a 
concern in its decision by finally noting that “[t]he issue here is not 
constitutional but statutory.”138
C. Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
1. Analysis 
Still displeased with the outcome, APAC appealed its case to 
the Minnesota Supreme Court.139  As Minnesota’s first supreme 
court interpretation of the Freedom of Expression statute,140 the All 
Parks opinion analyzes statutory interpretation to determine the 
meaning of “reasonable limits” as the term appears in section 
327C.13.141  Using another section of the Manufactured Home Park 
Lot Rentals chapter 327C.01, entitled “Definitions,”142 the court lists 
four elements that constitute a “reasonable rule” a park owner can 
make.143  The court uses another subdivision of the Definitions 
section of chapter 327C144
                                                          
 138. Id. 
 139. See All Parks, 732 N.W.2d at 193. 
 140. MINN. STAT. § 327C.13 (2006). 
 141. See All Parks, 732 N.W.2d at 193–94.  For a description of the steps 
involved in statutory interpretation, see MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2006).  See also 
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Bjelland, 710 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. 2006) (identifying that 
the first inquiry of statutory interpretation is determining whether the statute is 
ambiguous); Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 698 N.W.2d 1, 8 
(Minn. 2005) (defining “ambiguous” in statutory interpretation as being 
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation); Am. Family Ins. Group v. 
Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000) (advocating the interpretation of 
each section in light of its surrounding sections in order to avoid conflicting 
interpretations of the statute); Bd. of Educ. of Minneapolis v. Sand, 227 Minn. 
202, 210, 34 N.W.2d 689, 694 (1948) (highlighting that statutory definitions of 
words used elsewhere in the statute furnish authoritative evidence of the 
legislature’s intent and meaning). 
 to add an additional element onto the 
 142. MINN. STAT. § 327C.01 subdiv. 8 (2006). 
 143. A reasonable rule is a park rule: 
(a) which is designed to promote the convenience, safety or welfare of 
the residents, promote the good appearance and facilitate the efficient 
operation of the park, protect and preserve the park premises, or make a 
fair distribution of services and facilities; 
(b) which is reasonably related to the purpose for which it is adopted; 
(c) which is not retaliatory or unjustifiably discriminatory in nature; and 
(d) which is sufficiently explicit in prohibition, direction, or limitation of 
conduct to fairly inform the resident of what to do or not to do to 
comply. 
All Parks, 732 N.W.2d at 194. 
 144. A park owner may not enforce a rule that is a “substantial modification” 
of the resident’s rental agreement.  Id.  Substantial modification is defined as “any 
18
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reasonable limitations Uniprop is able to make regarding 
noncommercial speech within the park.145  Like the court of 
appeals, the supreme court rejected the argument that First 
Amendment principles should play a role in the analysis of 
Uniprop’s restrictions, and capped its analysis of the 
reasonableness of the restrictions solely on five prongs.146
2. Holding 
 
The supreme court’s majority held that, as blue-penciled by 
the district court, the limits on noncommercial speech and 
solicitation in Ardmor Park are reasonable under Minnesota law.147  
The district court added an extra day (Saturday) to the prescribed 
time and included an extra hour during the longer days of 
summer.148
(5) did not significantly diminish or eliminate any 
material right, privilege or freedom of action of a 
resident.
  According to the court, the time limitations, as 
amended: 
(1) were designed to promote the quiet and peaceful use 
of the community; 
(2) were reasonably related to that purpose; 
(3) were not retaliatory in nature; 
(4) were sufficiently explicit in direction; and 
149
The district court found the need to blue-pencil the limitations 
because the second prong, primarily, was not fulfilled by Uniprop’s 
rule.
 
150  The supreme court agreed with the district court’s 
judgment in relaxing the time constraints placed by Uniprop, and, 
like the lower courts, did not deem the use of a no-contact list to be 
unreasonable.151
                                                                                                                                  
change in a rule which: (a) significantly diminishes or eliminates any material 
obligation of the park owner; (b) significantly diminishes or eliminates any 
material right, privilege or freedom of action of a resident; or (c) involves a 
significant new expense for a resident.”  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 327C.02 subdiv. 
11 (2006)).  The court uses element (b) of this section in its analysis of the 
reasonableness of Uniprop’s limitations.  Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 195. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
  In effect, both APAC and Uniprop failed to meet 
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their goals in All Parks.152  Uniprop wanted APAC to be barred from 
accessing Ardmor, at least as much as possible, and APAC sought to 
effect social change through a court holding that the First 
Amendment applied to MHPs.153  Although neither one of these 




The two dissenting justices agreed with APAC, arguing that 
“section 327C.13 extends the application of the First Amendment 
to manufactured home parks.”156  Aside from that, the dissent also 
disagreed with the majority’s holding that Ardmor’s rule, as 
modified by the district court, is reasonable.157  Justice Page 
contends that Ardmor’s time restriction rules are not reasonably 
related to the purpose for which they were allegedly adopted and 
that they are retaliatory in nature.158
                                                          
 152. See All Parks, 732 N.W.2d 189. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 
 
 155. APAC - Mission and History, supra note 106.  According to the 
organization’s 2007 history, “APAC successfully argued before the Minnesota 
Supreme Court that no park owner can prohibit residents or others from 
peacefully organizing, assembling, canvassing, leafleting, or otherwise expressing 
their right of free expression in parks.”  Id.  Classifying the case as a victory is likely 
a marketing device for APAC, though it would strain integrity to claim All Parks as 
a true “victory” after APAC appealed the case twice—with both the appellate 
courts affirming the original ruling of the district court.  See All Parks Alliance for 
Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. Income Fund, No. A05-912, 2006 
WL 618932, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 732 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 2007). 
 156. All Parks, 732 N.W.2d at 198 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id.  In a pointed analysis, Justice Page illustrates that “Uniprop’s rule 
restricts politicians seeking to go door-to-door to solicit votes, residents who would 
speak out in opposition to the actions of park management, a neighborhood 
association soliciting participation in a neighborhood watch group, and trick-or-
treaters seeking to go door-to-door on Halloween in the same manner that it 
restricts APAC.”  Id. at 200.  Interestingly, the oral arguments for All Parks were 
held at Hutchinson High School and the students in attendance “seemed to 
particularly enjoy it” when Justice Page asked Uniprop’s counsel if Ardmor’s 
restrictions and no-contact list would apply to trick-or-treaters.  Ivan Raconteur, 
Minnesota Supreme Court visits Hutchinson High School, HERALD J., Oct. 16, 2006, 
available at http://www.herald-journal.com/Archives/2006/stories/supreme.html. 
 158. See All Parks, 732 N.W.2d at 198–99 (Page, J., dissenting). 
20
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
By refusing to accept the argument that First Amendment 
principles should apply in the interpretation of section 327C.13, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court reiterated its general unwillingness 
to expand through discretion personal liberties beyond the scope 
of those conferred by the U.S. Constitution.159  In response, the 
dissenters argue two general ideas that they contend warrant the 
application of the First Amendment: the Marsh “functional 
equivalent” exception,160 and the Minnesota legislature’s authority 
and intent to provide the right to free expression by statutory 
provision through section 327C.13.161
A.  MHPs Under the Scrutiny of Marsh 
 
The dissent’s implied argument for First Amendment 
application to MHP expression is that MHPs are the “functional 
                                                          
 159. See State v. Scholberg, 412 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).  
Compare State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726–27 (Minn. 1985) (reversing the 
supreme court’s holding that the Minnesota Constitution’s double jeopardy clause 
did not permit retrial when the Federal Constitution would not), and AFSCME 
Councils 6, 14, 65 & 96 v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 570 n.12 (Minn. 1983) 
(restating that the prohibition against arbitrary lending is coextensive with that of 
the federal equal protection clause), and State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 
N.W.2d 735, 738 n.6 (Minn. 1981) (noting that the protection of commercial 
speech provided by the Minnesota Constitution is no more than that provided by 
the United States Constitution), with Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 
1993) (pointing out that “Minnesota is not limited by the United States Supreme 
Court and can provide more protection under the state constitution than is 
afforded under the federal constitution.”) (emphasis added). 
 160. Though not specifically stated, the dissent’s likening of a manufactured 
home park owner to an “unelected mayor of a bedroom community” and the park 
itself to a “form of private government” at least hints at an intent to characterize 
an MHP as the functional equivalent of a town or municipality.  See All Parks, 732 
N.W.2d at 197 (Page, J., dissenting).  The First Amendment applies to individuals 
on private property which has taken on all the attributes of a town or municipality.  
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 516 (1946). 
 161. The dissent argues that terms of art derived from First Amendment 
jurisprudence are used in the statute which indicate the legislature’s intent to 
apply the First Amendment to manufactured home parks, including: “free 
expression,” “noncommercial,” “peacefully organizing, assembling, canvassing, 
leafleting,” and “reasonable limits as to time, place and manner.”  All Parks, 732 
N.W.2d at 198 (Page, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).  These terms of art, 
the dissent argues, compel First Amendment application because they have 
“accumulated the . . . meaning of centuries of practice, [the legislature] 
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each 
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning 
its use will convey to the judicial mind.”  Id. at 197 (Page, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)). 
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equivalent” of a municipality.162  The dissent hints at the similarities 
between an MHP and an actual town163 in much the same way the 
company town was likened to an actual town in Marsh.164  An MHP 
is similar to a town in many ways and owners set rules for conduct 
within the park much the same way a town does.165  On its face, an 
MHP simply looks like a town within a town.166  It is unlikely, 
however, that an MHP could meet the very stringent requirements 
for this exception as the company town did in Marsh.  MHPs lack 
business blocks, stores, service establishments, and other town-like 
aspects Marsh mentions.167
What most distinguishes an MHP from the company town in 
Marsh is accessibility.  The court in Marsh notes that the 
“[company] town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely 
used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish 
them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that 
the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.”
 
168
                                                          
 162. Cf. id. at 197 (Page, J., dissenting) (quoting many of Senator Merriam’s 
concerns about the power imbalance between MHP owners and residents 
resembling a form of government). 
 163. See id. at 197 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 164. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507–08. 
 165. LORI SWANSON, MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE MANUFACTURED HOME 
PARKS HANDBOOK 11 (2008) (noting that “just like a municipality, the park can set 
reasonable limits on the time, place and manner of [free expression] activities.”). 
  
Columbia real estate law Professor Curtis Burger devised a list of 
guidelines to determine public versus private property and 
determined the following factors to be indicative of private 
 166. See HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 129–30.  Hart emphasizes this observation 
regarding newer MHPs.  Id. 
Upscale mobile home parks have been developed in recent years because 
the handsome new models of mobile homes need a setting more 
congenial than traditional utilitarian parks provide.  A few of the new 
upscale parks, which the developers prefer to call “resorts” or 
“communities” are in the urban fringes of major cities . . . [and] look like 
conventional suburban subdivisions. 
Id.  Hart also explains that the intent in forming an MHP is to make it look like a 
town.  Id. at 28. 
When people took up permanent residence, they wanted parks that 
looked more like suburbs and mobiles that looked more like houses.  
Parks for mobile homes had to have larger lots as the units got larger, 
and in many parks the lots were laid out diagonally to the street, in 
herringbone fashion.  Curving the streets even gently helped to make 
parks look less monotonous, and lots were clustered around cul-de-sacs 
when it became apparent that units were no longer likely to be moved. 
Id. 
 167. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502–503. 
 168. Id. at 503 (emphasis added). 
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property: expectation of privacy, expectation of quiet, limited 
physical access, freedom of association, right of exclusion, 
exclusivity of possession, and expectation of security.169  MHPs offer 
variable expectations of privacy, security, and quiet: some can be 
categorized as “semipublic”170 and others as completely private.171  
However, MHPs are undeniably private property; the fact that there 
is an owner who can rightfully exclude those he does not want 
within his park leaves the Marsh exception inapplicable to MHPs.172  
Similarly, in United States v. Francouer, the Fifth Circuit determined 
that the Marsh rationale did not apply to Disney World because it 
was “not an open town fully accessible and available to all commerce. . . .  
No one is permitted into the outer gates . . . except by consent of the 
owners.”173
B. Contravention of Legislative Intent 
Failure of the Marsh test notwithstanding, the First 
Amendment should still apply to MHPs because the Minnesota 
Legislature intended for its application.  Section 327C.13 reads: 
[F]REEDOM OF EXPRESSION. 
 
No park owner shall prohibit or adopt any rule 
prohibiting residents or other persons from peacefully 
organizing, assembling, canvassing, leafletting or 
otherwise exercising within the park their right of free 
expression for noncommercial purposes.  A park owner 
may adopt and enforce rules that set reasonable limits as 
to time, place and manner.174
The concepts contained in section 327C.13 are derived directly 
from First Amendment jurisprudence.
 
175
                                                          
 169. Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 653–54 (1991). 
  Terms like “free 
 170. See HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 81–82.  “Utilitarian mobile home parks 
perforce are semipublic places.  Single-wides are so cramped that residents spend 
much of their lives outside, and lots are so small that parks have less privacy and 
far more social interaction than conventional residential suburbs.”  Id. at 81. 
 171. See id. at 82.  Hart differentiates between upscale parks and traditional 
utilitarian parks noting that many of the newer, more upscale parks have guarded 
gatehouses with twenty-four hour security.  Id. 
 172. E.g., id. at 79. 
 173. United States v. Francouer, 547 F.2d 891, 893–94 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(emphasis added). 
 174. MINN. STAT. § 327C.13 (2006). 
 175. All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. 
Income Fund, 732 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Minn. 2007) (Page, J., dissenting). 
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expression,” “noncommercial,” “peacefully organizing, assembling, 
canvassing, leafleting,” and “reasonable limits as to time, place and 
manner,” are all terms of art with “special meaning under the First 
Amendment.”176  Additionally, Senator Merriam’s comments 
regarding MHPs as a form of “private government”177 and MHP 
owners as “unelected mayor[s]”178 indicate that the legislature 
intended to protect individual MHP residents from owners in the 
same way that the First Amendment protects individual citizens 
from oppressive government bodies.179
It is extremely doubtful that in section 327C.13 the legislature 
would use such First Amendment terms of art casually.  In fact, the 
only other use of the term “freedom of expression” anywhere in the 
Minnesota Statutes appears in section 198.32, which deals with 
residents’ rights in veterans homes.
 
180  Section 198.32 reads: “A 
resident of a Minnesota veterans home has the right to complain 
and otherwise exercise freedom of expression and assembly which is 
guaranteed by amendment I of the United States Constitution.”181
C. The Failure of Refusing Broadened Constitutional Protection 
  
Noting its language, there is little doubt that the legislature was well 
aware of the implications of the phrase “freedom of expression” in 
section 198.32.  This substantiates the notion that the intended 
consequences of using the same language in section 327C.13 were 
the application of First Amendment principles. 
In addition to the intent of the legislature, the First 
Amendment should apply to MHPs because there are sound 
reasons to broaden the interpretation of the Minnesota 
Constitution.  As previously discussed, Minnesota’s “long tradition 
of affording persons on the periphery of society a greater measure 
of government protection and support than may be available 
elsewhere” has been cited by the court as a legitimate reason for a 
                                                          
 176. Id. 
 177. Merriam Memo, supra note 85, at 1. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Cf. All Parks, 732 N.W.2d at 197 (Page, J., dissenting) (positing that the 
legislature’s intent was to “remedy . . . the abuse of power by manufactured home 
park owners [over] . . . park residents” and calling section 327C.13 a “tool for 
rectifying that imbalance”).  Even a strict textualist looking only at the “objective 
indication of the words” in section 327C.13 could recognize their derivation from 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 180. MINN. STAT. § 198.32 subdiv. 1 (2006). 
 181. Id. (emphasis added). 
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broader state constitutional interpretation.182  Indeed, government 
protection for society’s periphery is an honorable social target, 
though in All Parks, the court fell well short of the mark.  It is at the 
court’s discretion whether to broaden its constitutional 
interpretation,183 and the Minnesota Supreme Court missed a 
shining opportunity in All Parks to set a national example.  Nearly 
ten years ago, the court in State v. Wicklund admitted that “the 
Minnesota Constitution may offer broader protection than the 
federal first amendment,”184 but then refused to extend that 
protection to mall protesting.185  Maybe the protection of strictly 
provocative protest speech does not provide a compelling reason 
for a broader interpretation,186 but the freedom of expression for 
those in a marginalized and oppressed sector of society more than 
qualifies.  The court once acknowledged that “as the highest court of 
this state, we are ‘independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of 
[our] citizens.’”187
The Minnesota Supreme Court has revealed that it will 
generally avoid a constitutional ruling if there is another way a case 
can be decided.
 
188  In All Parks, the majority opinion determined 
that the “other way” was the interpretation of section 327C.13.189  
Admittedly, All Parks might not have been the perfect opportunity 
for the Minnesota Supreme Court to take a stand and apply the 
First Amendment to MHPs.  After all, it was not just Uniprop that 
opposed APAC; indeed many of the residents of Ardmor did not 
want APAC bothering them at home.190
                                                          
 182. Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 30 (Minn. 1995); See also 
supra Part II. 
 183. See, e.g., State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1999). 
 184. Id. at 800. 
 185. Id. at 803 (holding that the Minnesota Constitution “does not, under the 
circumstances here, offer greater protection to speech than the First Amendment  
. . . .”). 
 186. Id. at 802–03. 
  Perhaps for the residents 
 187. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990) (quoting State v. Fuller, 
347 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) (emphasis added by the French court in 
original)). 
 188. See State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 2006).  But cf. Erlandson 
v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724, 732 n.7 (Minn. 2003) (deviating from the usual 
practice of avoiding a constitutional ruling if there is another basis on which a case 
can be decided because, based on the circumstances, prudence dictated it). 
 189. All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. 
Income Fund, 732 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 2007). 
 190. See id. at 192.  The court explains that Ardmor residents voluntarily added 
their names to a “no-contact” list that comprised residents who chose not to allow 
leafleting, canvassing, or door-to-door solicitation of any kind at their home, 
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of Ardmor, the All Parks result seemed good: the no-contact list 
prevents activist groups like APAC from pestering unreceptive 
residents.191
The All Parks holding is shortsighted though; how long before 
someone else comes knocking?  And what if a resident wants to 
hand out fliers notifying residents of the park owner’s intent to 
enact yet another rule?  Section 327C.02 prohibits a park owner 
from substantially modifying a rule without prior written notice,
 
192 
with “substantial modification” being defined as “any change in a 
rule which . . . significantly diminishes or eliminates any material 
right, privilege or freedom of action of a resident.”193  There is little 
doubt that APAC would be back in court to represent a park 
resident alleging that a no-contact list violates his freedom of 
expression.194  Myriad foreseeable examples on top of those Justice 
Page mentions195
Perhaps it is merely judicial stubbornness or a dogged aversion 
to the concept of liberally expanding rights beyond those 
conferred by the Constitution that kept the First Amendment out 
of the holding in All Parks.  Ironically though, the very court that is 
proud and willing to expand its constitutional interpretation for 
the purpose of protecting “the little guy”
 yield this an issue better addressed under First 
Amendment principles. 
196
                                                                                                                                  
regardless of purpose.  Id. 
 191. Id. at 195. 
 192. MINN. STAT. § 327C.02 subdiv. 2 (2006). 
 193. MINN. STAT. § 327C.01 subdiv. 11 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 194.  
APAC's Mission is to serve as a vehicle to promote meaningful social 
change, to protect the legal rights of park residents, and to improve the quality 
of life in manufactured home parks. APAC works to promote the health, 
safety and welfare of manufactured homeowners through community 
organizing, legal advocacy, housing preservation and legislative advocacy. 
All Parks Alliance for Change Mission and History, 
http://www.allparksallianceforchange.org/?q=mission (last visited Dec. 15, 2008) 
(emphasis added). 
 195. Justice Page comes up with a few possible victims of the no-contact list: 
politicians soliciting votes, residents speaking in opposition to park management, 
neighborhood associations soliciting participants in a neighborhood watch group 
and trick-or-treaters hungry for candy on Halloween.  All Parks, 732 N.W.2d at 200 
(Page, J., dissenting).  Of course there are more examples such as religious groups 
seeking new followers, local fundraisers, Christmas carolers, and charity groups 
going door-to-door with food donations. 
 refused to do just that 
in All Parks.  A likely explanation is the lack of popular support for 
 196. See, e.g., Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 30 (Minn. 1995); 
Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 831–32 (Minn. 1991); State 
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990). 
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the proverbial “trailer trash” segment of society.197  While abortion 
privacy rights are worthy of a broader interpretation,198
If the majority had reasoned differently and decided that First 
Amendment principles should apply in determining whether a 
manufactured park owner’s rule violates free expression, the 
court’s eventual holding would likely be the same.  Under the 
constitutional standard, park owners would still be allowed to 
enforce rules to reasonably control the time, place, and manner of 
expression within MHPs.
 MHP 
residents may have lacked the same public outcry or lobbying 
power to compel the court’s socially progressive protection. 
199
The similarities between the constitutional limitations of free 




                                                          
 197. See generally HART ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. 
On the scale of general social acceptability, mobile home parks rank 
somewhere in the neighborhood of junkyards, but junkyards for people 
rather than automobiles.  They are segregated to remote and unattractive 
places in the less desirable parts of the outer urban fringes, discreetly 
distanced from other kinds of residential areas, and carefully 
camouflaged by plantings, fences, or high earthen balks to keep them 
from offending the sensitivities of better folk who might happen to 
wander past. 
Id. 
 198. See Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 30. 
 199. See Koppinger v. City of Fairmont, 311 Minn. 186, 192, 248 N.W.2d 708, 
712 (1976).  Accord Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) 
(acknowledging that a property owner may make time, place, and manner 
regulations on expression that minimize interference with commercial functions); 
16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 984 (2005) (recognizing that [e]ven when the 
owner of private property is constitutionally obligated to honor the assembly rights 
of others the owner is entitled to fashion reasonable rules to control the mode, 
opportunity, and site for the exercise of such rights on the property, but such rules 
may not be based on the content of the expression sought to be exercised or on 
an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.) (emphasis added).  Any 
enforceable limitation an MHP owner could create must not be content-based, 
must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest, and must leave open 
alternative means of the exercise of freedom of expression.  See id.  See also Clark v. 
Cmty. for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 200. Compare Koppinger v. City of Fairmont, 311 Minn. 186, 192, 248 N.W.2d 
708, 712 (1976) (allowing time, place and manner controls on First Amendment-
protected expression on private property), with MINN. STAT. § 327C.13 (2006) 
(allowing an MHP owner to adopt and enforce free expression rules that set 
reasonable limits as to time, place and manner). 
  Thus, it is doubtful that a noticeably different holding 
would have been reached: APAC would be able to have access to 
Ardmor residents at reasonable times.  Perhaps the court was afraid 
that if it did extend First Amendment principles to MHPs, there 
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would be countless more groups advocating for other broadened 
interpretations of the Minnesota Constitution.  Nevertheless, if the 
court had written a narrow holding extending the First 
Amendment only to MHPs, it could have simultaneously alleviated 
fears of loaded dockets and lived up to its past decisions201
V. CONCLUSION 
 that 
displayed Minnesota’s commendable values. 
Presently, the unpredictable housing market202 coupled with 
the growing trend of manufactured home ownership203 will almost 
certainly trigger the need for further judicial interpretation of 
section 327C.13.  The district court, instead of agreeing with either 
party, blue-penciled Uniprop’s restrictions and met the parties on a 
dubious middle ground.204
                                                          
 201. See, e.g., Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 30 (Minn. 1995); 
Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 831–32 (Minn. 1991); 
  Whatever the holding, the supreme 
court’s refusal to apply First Amendment principles to MHPs serves 
as a glaring deviation from its record of social progressivism.  The 
court ignored both the noble intentions of the legislature as well as 
the plight of MHP residents.  If change is to be made regarding 
MHP treatment, it may need to be legislated in coming sessions.  It 
seems that the supreme court is willing to continue allowing MHP 
owners to make rules regarding free expression independent of the 
jurisdiction of the First Amendment.  In the spirit of Jeff 
Foxworthy’s test, if you think “social consciousness” means how well 





v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990). 
 202. Floyd Norris, Sorting out the New Housing Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/business/18norris.html?_r=1& 
oref=slogin. 
 203. See Minnesota Manufactured Housing Association, The Growing Impact 
of Factory-Built Homes on Minnesota, http://www.mnmfghome.org/ 
media/impact.php (last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
 204. APAC sought free expression between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 
p.m. seven days a week, combined with the removal of the no-contact list.  Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellant at 48, All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured 
Hous. Cmtys. Income Fund, 732 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 2007) (No. A-05-0912).  
Uniprop’s rule stated “[l]eafleting and canvassing is permitted on Monday 
through Friday between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.” and included the 
no-contact list.  All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Manufactured Hous. 
Cmtys. Income Fund, 732 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Minn. 2007). 
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